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Abstract: 
In his American University address, Kennedy employed epideictic progression, a 
pedagogical process drawing upon dissociation and epideictic norms to convince listeners, 
gradually, to embrace a new vision—in this case, a world in which a test ban treaty with the 
USSR was possible. To do so, Kennedy’s words: (1) united the audience behind the value of 
“genuine peace”; (2) humanized the Soviets as worthy partners in genuine peace; (3) established 
the reality of the Cold War and the credibility of US leadership; and (4) connected lessons on 
genuine peace to domestic civil rights. 
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John F. Kennedy at American University: 
The Rhetoric of the Possible, Epideictic Progression, and the Commencement of Peace 
In 1963, an ideological battle—begun in the post-war era—continued to dominate US-
Soviet relations, and President John F. Kennedy was in a tough spot. After campaigning on 
charges of a missile gap, he had intensified his cold warrior persona by creating the most 
formidable military the world has ever seen and continuing his hardline anticommunist rhetoric.1 
In the terrifying wake of the missile crisis, however, the Kennedy administration identified the 
need for a more conciliatory relationship with the USSR, which could occur only through a new 
foreign policy strategy of détente.2 
The first major step toward such a strategy was achievement of a limited nuclear test ban 
treaty, which Kennedy now was in a better position to persuade Americans to accept due to his 
increased political capital after the missile crisis. Although a test ban was in the nation’s best 
interests, it would not be an easy sell, as the president’s previous confrontational rhetoric had left 
little room for compromise and reinforced anticommunist sentiments. To convince citizens, 
Kennedy needed to create a new context in which the public could view US-Soviet relations. He 
also had to reassure allies that the United States would still uphold security agreements and the 
USSR that a test ban treaty was in its interests, too.3 
To help shape this new reality, the president delivered a commencement address on June 
10, 1963, at American University that would be judged one of the greatest American speeches of 
the 20th century.4 The address also marked a dramatic change in US foreign policy, from one 
focused upon preparation for possible nuclear war to one embarked on the potential for a test ban 
treaty and improved US-Soviet relations.5 
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To initiate such a shift, Kennedy’s speech demonstrated a new understanding of reality—
the possibility of peace with an adversary—that the audience should embrace. More specifically, 
we posit that Kennedy's American University address is an exemplar of what we term “epideictic 
progression,” a rhetorical process distinguished by use of the teaching role assigned to epideictic 
speakers to alter perceptions of reality that directly influence one another, gradually moving from 
the most abstract concepts to the most specific. Epideictic progression draws on cultural 
materials already familiar to the audience and relies heavily upon dissociation and epideictic 
norms to modify the audience’s view of reality in strategic steps, with the first perceptual shift 
requiring explanation for acceptance before the subsequent one can be acknowledged as 
legitimate. As rhetors move from one perception to the next, they interweave each altered 
concept with the ones preceding it, thereby creating an overall understanding that aims to foster 
attitudinal inducement to act in new ways. 
Despite its historical significance and assessment as Kennedy’s greatest speech,6 
relatively few scholars have examined the American University address.7 The analysis of 
Kennedy’s epideictic progression provides additional insight into how rhetors can use epideictic 
discourse, typically considered traditionalist or conservative in nature,8 to challenge prevailing 
views.9 In particular, our case study expands on Vivian’s 2009 efforts to understand how 
“epideictic performances” may “contribute to or detract from the work of political 
transformation” needed to end intrastate conflicts, as in Yugoslavia,10 by considering a study of 
epideictic discourse in interstate conflict. Since past research has focused on how presidents 
exploit epideictic rhetoric to conduct war,11 Kennedy’s address allows us to discern how the art 
of praise and blame might, alternatively, be used for the purpose of peace. 
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Furthermore, this analysis illuminates the president's discourse more broadly. Many of 
Kennedy's finest rhetorical moments came in epideictic speeches, such as his inaugural.12 
According to Murphy, the president was especially fond of commencement addresses because he 
saw his "entire administration as a ritual of transition, a movement from one generation to the 
next, and that fit well with graduation speeches." Commencement speeches, as a form of 
epideictic, were compatible with Kennedy's preference for "high style" in his oratory and 
allowed him "to speak as historian, teacher, and statesman."13 We agree with Murphy's 
assessment. Through our analysis, we aim to shed further light on how Kennedy relied on 
epideictic discourse to forward his persuasive goal at American University and why 
commencement speeches may have been well suited for providing new perspectives on 
recalcitrant problems, whether matters of economics or war and peace. 
We begin our examination by discussing how the combination of epideictic norms and 
dissociation offers an appealing approach for rhetors who aim to transform listeners’ perceptions 
of reality. Next, we provide a context for Kennedy’s address and then analyze the president’s use 
of epideictic progression. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis. 
The Partnership of Dissociation and Epideictic Norms in Epideictic Progression 
 According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, dissociation takes place when rhetors split 
a unitary concept and associate their position with the preferred term. The result is to integrate 
two “philosophical pairs” or opposed terms into a new definition that still bears markers of the 
old, thereby making its acceptance more likely, yet also facilitating the rhetors’ argument.14 For 
instance, a gun control advocate may claim that measures restricting gun ownership would 
provide “real security,” a phrase that splits security into that which is “real” and that which is 
“false.” In doing so, the rhetor makes her position more appealing by associating it with security, 
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yet differentiates it in a positive way from the policy of relatively unfettered gun ownership 
typically associated with security and which, through this maneuver, becomes the less preferred 
option since—by implication—the current policy offers only “false security.”15 
 When successful, dissociations alter audiences’ perceptions of reality, with the result that 
dissociations may function as argumentative techniques and also become the grounds from 
which future argument proceeds.16 Listeners, however, often resist dissociations, especially if 
they believe the rhetor is using an explicitly persuasive “device” intended to alter their views.17 
How, then, to generate compelling dissociations? The answer: epideictic rhetoric. 
 First, epideictic rhetoric can make an audience more receptive to dissociation. Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that when “the hearers share the speaker’s respect or admiration 
for values extolled” in an epideictic speech, “such a speech will rarely be felt to be a process,” 
thereby allowing the rhetor to engage in dissociation without antagonizing listeners.18 The rhetor, 
that is, begins by praising values the audience holds in high esteem and/or decrying values that 
the audience holds in low repute. From that basis, the rhetor then can engage in dissociation of 
said values to move the audience, gradually, to a new perspective. 
 Epideictic rhetoric, at its best, engages the audience as a participant in the promulgation 
of positive change, a partnership also needed for dissociation. While Aristotle has been translated 
as relegating the epideictic audience to theoroi, akin to spectators at the theatre, as opposed to 
kritai or judges of forensic and deliberative rhetoric, recent scholars have noted that theoros has 
other meanings, as well: “philosopher” or one who contemplates, and even “an ‘ambassador’ 
sent to consult an oracle.”19 These latter two meanings, which convey a deeper sense of audience 
involvement, reflect how the early sophists envisioned epideictic rhetoric. Indeed, epideictic 
messages have the potential, Walker argues, to ask listeners “to form opinions, or even to revise 
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their existing beliefs and attitudes on a given topic.”20 Vivian points to how leaders have used 
epideictic discourse in an effort to alter attitudes perpetuating domestic conflict by praising 
citizens for overcoming past mistakes, as with Mandela in post-Apartheid South Africa, and by 
attributing responsibility for conflict to all citizens, as in Lincoln’s second inaugural.21 Just 
because a message is epideictic, however, does not mean that the audience will act as 
“contemplative theoroi; nor does it rule out that possible response.” Rhetors can encourage 
listeners’ thoughtful participation or their passive acceptance, and audiences also bring their own 
predispositions to the rhetorical situation.22 Nonetheless, epideictic rhetoric has the capacity to 
engage the audience in a process of reflection and change, permitting it to work compatibly with 
dissociation which likewise requires the audience’s active involvement in its conceptual 
reconfigurations.23 
 Dissociation and epideictic rhetoric also share overlapping stylistic associations, for 
dissociations often arrive through rhetorical figures typical of high style. Antithesis, in which 
opposing ideas are conjoined, is especially ripe for dissociations, as in Barry Goldwater’s 1964 
assertion that “Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice, moderation in the pursuit of justice is 
no virtue.”24 In polyptoton, the rhetor repeats “words from the same root but with different 
endings,” which likewise may provide an elegant form of dissociation. Obama, for example, 
suggested the new kind of presidential leadership he had to offer when he announced his 
candidacy in 2007 in Springfield, Illinois, and reflected on his work as a state senator:  “It was 
here we learned to disagree without being disagreeable—that it’s possible to compromise so 
long as you know those principles that can never be compromised. . . .”25 
Stylistic figures like these fit most comfortably within the high style of epideictic 
rhetoric, with its roots in ancient Greek poetry from which Gorgias and other early sophists 
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borrowed as they developed epideictic in the form of free verse, what Walker describes as “a 
mode of rhythmic discourse that relied on schemes—such as repetition, symmetry, opposition, 
and balance.”26 Indeed, scholars have repeatedly noted epideictic oratory’s strong relationship 
with poetry, manifested in its use of analogy, metaphor, alliteration, antithesis, repetition of 
sound, and so on.27 Particular figures like antithesis and polyptoton offer new perceptions of 
reality through dissociation, while their placement in an epideictic message seems fitting, 
stylistically. 
By means of this lexis or verbal style, the epideictic orator engages the audience 
affectively and prepares the groundwork for contemplation and possible deliberation.28 Burke 
explained this collaborative appeal of formal devices: “For instance, imagine a passage built 
about a set of oppositions (“we do this, but they on the other hand, do that; we stay here, but they 
go there; we look up, but they look down,” etc). Once you grasp the trend of the form, it invites 
participation regardless of the subject matter. Formally, you will find yourself swinging along 
with the succession of antitheses, even though you may not agree with the proposition that is 
being presented in this form.” A listener’s resistance will vary depending upon the degree of her 
original opposition to a proposition, but the universal appeal of form may help a listener “yield” 
to new perceptions by engaging her in a collaborative rhetorical process that appeals through 
high style and facilitates dissociation, but without drawing overt attention to persuasive intent.29  
 Another commonality of dissociation and epideictic rhetoric is their reliance upon ethos 
as proof. If listeners do not trust a rhetor, they will not accept the dissociations that he offers.30 
Likewise, because epideictic oratory does not focus on securing a particular policy or judicial 
decision, the role of ethos is paramount, even more so when the speaker offers potentially 
challenging dissociations. The speaker performs ethos through the rhetorical choices of the 
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speech itself. Therefore, the audience judges performance by assessing the epideictic rhetor’s 
selection of values to uphold and/or abhor, capacity to interpret reality in light of current or ideal 
cultural values, construction of her authority, provision of reasons for supporting her view of the 
world, ability to foster identification with listeners, skill at constructing a message by 
refashioning “fragments” from other cultural discourses, and adeptness of style.31 
 The performance of ethos is intertwined with rhetorical demonstration as proof. As 
Hauser explains, rhetorical demonstration in epideictic messages might seem at odds with 
demonstration in “mathematical, logical, or scientific arguments,” but they have much in 
common. Both are grounded in the subject matter of their concern, attempt to gain listeners’ 
commitment through showing or exhibiting, and make assertions based upon “purportedly 
irrefutable premises” since “rhetorical demonstrations possess an air of moral certainty that 
parallels the logical certainty” of these other types of proofs.32 Indeed, epideictic rhetors deal 
with the subject of cultural values; use lexis to create affective images that display the essential 
“truth” of some person or matter, rather than just presenting empirical facts; and make arguments 
about presumably indisputable moral truths to induce particular judgments and ethical positions 
in the audience.33 At epideictic rhetoric’s most compelling, Sheard observes that it “alters the 
reality in which it participates by making its vision a reality for its audience and instilling a belief 
that the power for realizing the vision lies with them.”34 The epideictic speaker’s rhetorical 
choices perform ethos that, in turn, impacts the willingness of the audience to accede to the 
process of reality transformation—including any dissociations offered—and the veracity of the 
rhetor’s message. Furthermore, assessment of the speaker’s eloquence serves as a judgment of 
the speaker’s leadership capability.35 
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If epideictic speakers ignore ethos, they doom themselves to failure, particularly if they 
seek to modify audience perceptions significantly. Agnew demonstrates this point in her analysis 
of New York Times correspondent, Christopher Hedges, and his 2003 commencement speech at 
Rockford College in which he acknowledged neither the occasion nor the graduates, and instead 
began with a “trenchant critique” of the US war with Iraq; only in his conclusion did Hedges 
appeal to the shared value of love, by which point the audience was booing him and security 
personnel had to escort him to safety.36 The pairing of epideictic discourse and dissociation is an 
enticing choice for transforming listeners’ views, but poor performance of ethos can lead to 
rejection of the speaker’s rhetorical demonstration of value precepts. 
One figure in American history who especially seemed to appreciate epideictic rhetoric’s 
potential as a vehicle for change was John F. Kennedy. In the following, we explain the 
rhetorical context for his epideictic progression at American University. 
Rhetorical Context for JFK’s Address at American University  
In 1963, the Kennedy administration’s primary foreign policy objective became détente 
with the USSR, specifically agreement on a limited test ban treaty to prohibit testing of nuclear 
weapons in space, the atmosphere, and under water.37 Although the president believed this treaty 
was in US interests, his anticommunist rhetoric during his first two years as president would 
make it difficult to change the public’s negative perceptions of the Soviets and, in turn, to gain 
acceptance of the treaty. Therefore, Kennedy had to create a new context in which the public 
could view the USSR and a possible test ban agreement.38 
The president was not, however, completely starting from scratch. A small but steady 
stream of Americans had been protesting both US and Soviet nuclear testing from his very first 
year in office. Beyond students and academics, women composed a major component of anti-
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nuclear activists due to revelations that high levels of Strontium-90, a radioactive isotope, had 
been found in breast milk. In November 1961, for example, Women Strike for Peace organized 
tens of thousands of women to protest in cities all over the country, including Washington, DC. 
On January 15, 1962, 2000 American women picketed the White House, leading the president to 
meet with them briefly. More protests followed.39 Altogether, the expressions of opposition 
raised questions about the rationality of current policies. 
These impulses toward peace also provided Kennedy with an opening, but his chances of 
success were far from secure. The male-dominated realm of politics was less likely to pay heed 
to the opinions of women, and certainly anti-nuclear activists did not represent the views of even 
most Americans. The October 1962 Cuban missile crisis had undoubtedly shaken citizens, even 
more so in light of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s March 1963 revelation that the world 
had been on the brink of nuclear war.40 For many, however, the incident simply reinforced what 
Wander described as prophetic dualism, a mode of argument descended from a fusion of 
Puritanism and World War I nationalism that became dominant during the Eisenhower-Dulles 
years. Prophetic dualism depicts a bipolar world in which one side “acts in accord with all that is 
good, decent, and at one with God’s will. The other acts in direct opposition. Conflict between 
them is resolved only through total victory of one side over the other.” A mere month after the 
crisis, for instance, columnist and conservative leader William F. Buckley, Jr., reflected on the 
potential for nuclear war that “if it is right that a single man is prepared to die for a just cause, it 
is right that an entire civilization be prepared to die for a just cause. . . .  [And] it can scarcely be 
disputed that if ever a cause was just, this one is, for the enemy combines the ruthlessness and 
savagery of Genghis Khan with the fiendish scientific efficiency of an IBM machine.” He 
concluded, “And if we die? We die.” As Wander aptly observed, prophetic dualism makes 
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compromise with the enemy very difficult to explain. Indeed, Kennedy faced opposition within 
his own party to a test ban agreement. For example, in March 1963 Senator Thomas J. Dodd of 
Connecticut declared that any concessions in negotiating a test ban treaty would inevitably 
strengthen “our declared enemy,” “court war,” and “invite the destruction of our country and our 
civilization.”41 Kennedy’s task in his American University speech was to exploit the opening that 
the expression of anxieties about nuclear weapons offered and to recast the context through 
which a critical mass of Americans still perceived U.S.-Soviet relations and a negotiated 
agreement on nuclear testing.  
According to Wander, the foreign policy rhetoric of the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, particularly on Vietnam, countered prophetic dualism with technocratic realism, 
a mode of argument that “finds the modern world much too complex for old time religion. Not 
the prophet, but rather a skilled, tough expert is what is needed.” Technocratic realism 
emphasizes expediency and rationality, justifies negotiation, and has its origins in the 
Progressive Era.42 In Kennedy’s American University address, we argue that the president 
evoked the broader strand of progressive thought, from which technocratic realism descends, to 
aid him in his persuasive endeavor. Progressivism may have been dormant in the Eisenhower-
Dulles years, but it was not dead, and its guiding principles (education, rationality, tolerance, 
democratic practices, optimism about the prospect for human advancement, and faith in expert 
problem solving)43 provided Kennedy with familiar cultural materials to help redefine the 
context of US-Soviet relations for his fellow Americans. Some of these ideas already resonated 
with citizens—even in the heyday of prophetic dualism, for instance, Americans retained great 
confidence in scientific expertise—but the growing voices of anti-nuclear opposition also 
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suggested that rhetorical efforts to reinvigorate progressive ideas like rationality and tolerance 
might well meet with success.  
The president’s address had other key audiences, as well. While European allies praised 
Kennedy for his management of the missile crisis, they were less than pleased he had allowed the 
crisis to develop in the first place. Indeed, French President Charles de Gaulle argued France was 
more capable of providing an effective nuclear deterrent to protect Western Europe than the 
United States, while West German officials were particularly leery of a test ban treaty and its 
implications for West German security. Only Great Britain, among the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization allies, already favored a test ban.44 In sum, Kennedy needed to convince allies that 
any agreement with the USSR would uphold their security interests, too. Here again, though, a 
small opening presented itself, as revealed by public protests against nuclear weapons in allied 
countries. In August 1962, for example, rallies took place in Japan and all over Europe to oppose 
the USSR’s resumption of nuclear testing, and in April 1963, 70,000 British demonstrators 
protested their own government’s ongoing development of nuclear weapons.45 While security 
concerns were paramount, some citizens in allied nations had begun to voice growing nuclear 
fears. Kennedy’s task was to speak to the former and make use of the opportunity posed by the 
latter. 
The USSR was also an important audience. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had 
agreed to discussions with Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on a possible 
test ban, but he had not yet indicated his decision to accept the limited test ban that the 
Americans had been offering for months, as opposed to a complete ban with other conditions 
related to Berlin that the premier preferred. Years later, evidence revealed that Khrushchev had 
already decided to accept the limited test ban when the president delivered his speech, but all 
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Kennedy knew at the time was that the premier faced internal political opposition—spearheaded 
by the Presidium’s Frol Kozlov and augmented by Soviet generals who supported tactical 
nuclear weapon use—due in part to what many viewed as Khrushchev’s embarrassing 
capitulation during the missile crisis. When a stroke incapacitated Kozlov in April 1963, pressure 
dissipated, but the premier still faced dissension in Moscow and among Eastern European 
governments for whom the missile crisis had undermined confidence in his leadership. 
Moreover, the Chinese, who maintained a tense alliance with the Soviets, had nuclear ambitions 
of their own and hence opposed a test ban. Because Khrushchev was sorting through all these 
problems, he had not yet revealed his decision to agree to the US proposal. Accordingly, 
Kennedy constructed his address with the idea of convincing Khrushchev and the Soviet political 
infrastructure to support a limited test ban.46 
The selection of American University’s commencement as the venue was strategic. As 
Ted Sorensen, Kennedy’s speechwriter and close advisor, later explained, American University 
was an ideal setting because it was known for “its focus on international affairs, including a 
program on conflict resolution.”47 The ceremony also allowed the president to make use of the 
“teacher role” that epideictic rhetors assume. Furthermore, as Windt observed, the transition that 
commencements mark nicely underscored the transition in perspectives that Kennedy was asking 
Americans to make in regard to US-Soviet relations.48 
The president also engaged in an uncharacteristic speechwriting process for strategic 
reasons by working solely with Sorensen to draft the address, consulting only a small group of 
advisors whom they swore to secrecy, and keeping the speech under wraps until two days before 
its delivery. Kennedy wanted to make a case for peace without bureaucratic intervention and 
feared, as Sorensen later explained, that Defense and State would insist on “the usual threats of 
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destruction, boasts of nuclear stockpiles, and lectures on Soviet treachery,” as well as conditions 
on any discussions.49 The altered process gave Kennedy greater control over rhetorical invention. 
As Kennedy took the stage at American University, then, he faced a challenging 
persuasive task. He not only had to help the graduates gracefully transition to a new chapter in 
their lives, but also he needed to transform his larger audiences’ views of the US-Soviet 
relationship so that they might support a limited test ban treaty and the transition to peace. While 
growing anti-nuclear protests and the sobering events of the Cuban missile crisis provided an 
opening, Kennedy confronted serious obstacles:  his past anticommunist rhetoric; domestic 
opposition, including within his own party; the cultural strains of prophetic dualism that still 
dominated so many American arguments and perceptions; the insecurities of Western European 
allies; and the seeming ambivalence of Khrushchev who also faced political pressures. The 
president’s response to this situation was to employ epideictic progression—drawing on familiar 
cultural materials in the form of progressivism as he did so—to move his diverse audience, 
gradually, toward a new vision of the world.   
Epideictic Progression in JFK’s American University Address 
From the start, Kennedy set the tone for both education and contemplation by stressing 
the setting. He referred to “President Woodrow Wilson,” who opened American University in 
1914, and to “Professor Woodrow Wilson,” who encouraged college graduates to embrace public 
service. Kennedy’s words thereby linked presidential and pedagogical roles through reference to 
one of the nation’s most famous progressive presidents. Moreover, Kennedy quoted British poet 
laureate John Masefield’s observation that the university is “‘a place where those who hate 
ignorance may strive to know, where those who perceive truth may strive to make others see.’”50 
By drawing attention to the university setting—an environment where the teacher-student 
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relationship prevails—the president asserted his epideictic role as the audience’s teacher, thus 
reinforcing his authority while placing listeners in the deferential position of attentive students.51 
His discussion of the setting was in keeping with progressivism’s faith in education as a solution 
to societal ills and also implied that Kennedy’s understanding of reality was, in fact, the “truth,” 
thereby bolstering his ethos, while his statement simultaneously praised listeners by suggesting 
their presence meant they disdained ignorant perceptions of reality and valued the imparting of 
knowledge. As Kennedy’s words were broadcast across the country and around the world,52 he 
established the pedagogical nature of his address for all listeners, as few would respond to a 
ceremonial message by asserting that they loved ignorance and had no desire for knowledge. 
In his speech, the president utilized epideictic progression by using both dissociation and 
epideictic norms to alter perceptions of reality that directly influenced one another. Epideictic 
progression begins with the rhetor engaging in praise and/or blame of some idea or entity in a 
manner congruent with audience perceptions and then strategically reflecting on that idea or 
entity and offering alternative perceptions through dissociation in conjunction with epideictic 
appeals, moving from the most abstract concepts to the most specific and meditating on each 
before reconceptualizing it. As the speaker offers each perceptual shift, she provides explanation 
to gain acceptance before moving to the next redefinition. The rhetor also interweaves each 
transformed perception with the ones that preceded it and thus provides an overall understanding 
that nurtures new attitudes and concomitant actions. 
At American University, Kennedy made use of epideictic progression to: (1) unite the 
audience behind the value of “genuine peace”; (2) humanize the Soviets as worthy partners in 
genuine peace; (3) establish the reality of the Cold War and the credibility of the US leadership 
needed; and (4) connect lessons on genuine peace to domestic civil rights. These moves enabled 
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Kennedy to appeal to his primary audience of American citizens, but also to reach out to 
European allies and the Soviet leadership. Furthermore, he paved the way for domestic action on 
civil rights by linking altered perceptions of international peace with peace at home. 
Uniting the Audience Behind “Genuine Peace” 
Beginning with the most abstract, but pivotal, concept related to a limited test ban, 
Kennedy addressed his domestic audience’s perception of peace. Most Americans valued peace, 
but perceived it in the post-war era as possible only if aggression were not tolerated. Therefore, 
an announcement regarding talks with the USSR on a test ban would almost certainly meet 
resistance from many US citizens who instinctively believed negotiation with the USSR meant 
tolerating Soviet aggression and putting peace at risk. 
 To alter these attitudes, Kennedy dissociated peace into “genuine peace” as a value 
around which Americans could unite. He and Sorensen crafted such a definition with help from a 
memorandum composed by National Security Council staffer Charles E. Johnson that outlined 
“the meaning of ‘peace’ in the last half of the 20th century” and compared the “unreal concept of 
peace” with what the president would term “genuine peace.” In addition, Kennedy and his 
speechwriter used Johnson’s notion that peace changes, as “Each generation must define peace 
for itself in meaningful terms.”53 Taking these ideas and running with them, the president tried to 
unite the audience behind a new and far more flexible understanding of peace in the 1960s that 
framed cooperation with the USSR as positive, rather than alarming. This peace was genuine 
peace. 
Employing epideictic progression, Kennedy attempted to shift the audience’s perception 
of peace by moving from the abstract to the more concrete. He began with familiar, idealistic 
outcomes of peace and then slowly transitioned to a more refined definition that constructed 
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peace not only as ideal, but also as rational, tolerant, democratic, and attainable, values often 
attributed to progressivism as well. Recalling his reference to the university setting, Kennedy 
first described world peace as “a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth [is] 
too rarely perceived.”54 He depicted peace as complicated and misunderstood, thereby justifying 
the need for clarification by an authoritative source. Given Kennedy’s celebrated heroism during 
World War II and successful resolution of the missile crisis, he came to American University 
with a reputation for knowledge on matters of war and peace. Thus, Kennedy took advantage of 
both his existing credibility and the epideictic nature of his address to assume responsibility for 
teaching his audience the true meaning of peace. According to the president, “genuine peace” 
was “Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war” and “Not the 
peace of the grave or the security of the slave.”55 Instead, he distinguished the true form of peace 
as “the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations 
to grow and to hope and build a better life for their children—not merely peace for Americans 
but peace for all men and women—not merely peace in our time but peace in all time.”56 Here, 
Kennedy employed dissociation through antithesis to create a broad, favorable definition of 
genuine peace that could resonate with Americans generally and also with nuclear testing 
opponents like Women Strike for Peace specifically. He described two abstract concepts of 
peace, one “genuine” and one false, such that the familiar, idealistic definition attached to 
genuine peace stood in stark contrast to the dark and menacing alternatives, thereby enticing 
listeners to investigate genuine peace further. Moreover, the contrast between the allusion to 
Neville Chamberlain’s infamous “peace in our time” and the president’s promise of “peace in all 
time” offered reassurance that the pursuit of genuine peace would secure international peace 
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indefinitely. He included the USSR and US allies, as well, by maintaining that genuine peace 
applied to “all.” 
By initially praising a broad and idealistic definition of genuine peace, Kennedy 
highlighted aspects of peace already recognizable to listeners since children grow up learning 
that peace brings happiness and promotes better living for all. This familiarity encouraged 
audience members to unite behind a common, identifiable understanding of peace and to feel 
they could relate to “genuine peace” without radically altering how they understood peace in the 
first place. Additionally, the abstract focus on peace’s idealistic outcomes framed it as a highly 
desirable goal that the audience would want to pursue. In all, Kennedy’s abstract definition of 
genuine peace made it a comfortable concept for listeners to accept and a sturdy platform on 
which he could build. 
Returning to the concept of genuine peace as a state neither enforced by weapons nor 
secured by acquiescence, Kennedy drew on epideictic norms by situating his audience in the 
present57 and simultaneously dissociating the idea of war. More precisely, he established “the 
new face of war” to demonstrate that nuclear weapons could not effectively bring peace, explain 
why world peace was such an urgent issue, and increase the overall appeal of genuine peace.58 
Unlike war of the past, the president argued that warfare in the atomic age was a zero sum game 
in which nuclear weapons produced no winners, only losers. Kennedy warned that total war in 
the nuclear age would be irreversible, far more destructive, and hence irrational. As he made his 
case, the president used anaphora, which stylistically appealed to listeners to accept his 
redefinition of war through repetitive form and emotional climax.59 
Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively 
invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It 
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makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the 
explosive force delivered by all of the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes 
no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be 
carried by the wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to 
generations yet unborn.60 
Although many citizens perceived nuclear armaments as essential to secure peace, 
Kennedy portrayed an unstable world in which nuclear weapons were not a safeguard against 
danger, but rather a step toward the annihilation of humankind. This state of affairs led to a clear 
conclusion:  peace was “the necessary, rational end of rational men.” As a result, Kennedy 
implored, “we have no more urgent task,”61 his rhetoric echoing progressivism’s emphasis on 
rationality. Altogether, the president’s focus on the futility and horrific consequences of nuclear 
war attempted to adjust the audience’s perception of reality by making genuine peace more 
attractive and the prospect of change in how most Americans viewed peace less alarming. If 
genuine peace prevailed, Americans would have no need to fear nuclear destruction.  
Nonetheless, Kennedy acknowledged that some citizens might understand the perils of 
nuclear weapons, but still see peace and disarmament as impractical until the Soviet Union 
assumed “a more enlightened attitude.”62 He disputed this mindset by asserting that Americans 
could help prompt such an attitudinal shift by reconsidering their own perceptions of peace, the 
USSR, and the Cold War. 
Again using epideictic progression, the president returned to the most abstract of those 
perceptions and asked his American pupils to reexamine their understanding of peace.63 Kennedy 
once more engaged in dissociation, this time by contrasting genuine peace with “absolute” peace 
or what he alliteratively described as a foolish concept associated only with “fantasies and 
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fanatics,” thereby simultaneously separating himself from extremists on both ends of the 
continuum. According to the president, those who ascribed to the inflexible idea of absolute 
peace held a “dangerous and defeatist belief” that only discouraged hope for a better future since 
absolute peace characterized peace as “impossible,” war as “inevitable,” and destiny as 
uncontrollable.64 
Genuine peace, by contrast, provided hope because it recognized that “no problem of 
human destiny” was “unsolvable,”65 words that conjured the nation’s progressive past with its 
indefatigable confidence that people could improve society.66 Moreover, genuine peace did not 
require absolute harmony to be sought or maintained between opposing parties, but instead 
merely required “mutual tolerance” and conflict resolution through “just and peaceful 
settlement.”67 Because genuine peace permitted “quarrels and conflicting interests,” Kennedy 
encouraged listeners to view peace with those who differed as possible and even desirable.68 
Accepting the concept of genuine peace as legitimate also meant Americans could seek a 
peaceful global community that would lead to a high quality of life and a secure future without 
legitimizing communism or weakening democracy. 
Kennedy refined his definition further when he claimed genuine peace fostered 
democratic principles because it relied on cooperation and negotiation. Not only was genuine 
peace a goal, but also a problem-solving “process” that, like congressional deliberation, 
produced “concrete actions” through “effective agreements” that incorporated the voices of 
multiple actors.69 Genuine peace was therefore both desirable and practical, particularly since it 
did not require people or nations to abandon foundational beliefs. Overall, Kennedy ascribed 
specific positive characteristics to genuine peace to shift the concept from an abstract idea to a 
concrete, rational goal achievable through a pragmatic, democratic process. His attributions of 
 21 
tolerance and democratic practices to genuine peace idealistically legitimized the concept by 
evoking the American progressivism of days past.70 At the same time, genuine peace, unlike 
nuclear weaponry, was an effective way to generate global security and democracy. 
Kennedy also argued that genuine peace was not unchanging, nor could it be achieved 
through the policies of just “one or two powers.” He explained, “Genuine peace must be the 
product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet 
the challenge of each new generation.”71 In this passage, Kennedy nodded to Western European 
allies by making clear that their partnership was needed, too. The president simultaneously 
linked the need for genuine peace with the challenge of nuclear weapons faced by a “new 
generation,” a phrase that broadly encompassed his own administration, the “new generation of 
Americans” that he invoked in his inaugural and which he represented, citizens around the globe 
who faced the new dangers of the atomic age, as well as the young graduates seated before him. 
Additionally, Kennedy pedagogically underscored the changing nature of genuine peace—
clearly reflecting Johnson’s memo—when he explained “history teaches us” that no matter how 
“fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, the tide of time and events will often bring surprising 
changes in the relations between nations and neighbors.”72 Thus, tension between the United 
States and the USSR was neither inevitable nor permanent and, while genuine peace could not be 
achieved by the United States alone, Americans could take the first step to transform US-Soviet 
relations. 
Finally, Kennedy stressed the importance of pursuing a reconceptualized goal of genuine 
peace when he stated, “Peace need not be impracticable, and war need not be inevitable. By 
defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can 
help all people to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly towards it.”73 Here, as 
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elsewhere in his speech, Kennedy performed dissociation through a high style employing 
antithesis, assonance, and balanced structure that aesthetically carried the listener along to his 
conclusion, while his progressive allusions to practicality and management made the redefinition 
plausible. 
Humanizing the Soviets as Worthy Partners in Genuine Peace 
 Kennedy’s reconceptualization of genuine peace had encouraged listeners to view peace 
with adversaries as possible. However, if the USSR were truly an evil nation with the aim of 
destroying the United States, then even genuine peace was unattainable. The president therefore 
used epideictic progression to alter such views in a gradual way. He explained that “genuine 
peace” was dependent not just upon the Soviets, but also upon Americans who must “reexamine 
our attitudes toward the Soviet Union.”74 
As with his redefinition of peace, Kennedy began with ideas familiar to the audience, 
slowly increasing the degree of change proposed so as to make perceptual transformations less 
alarming. He did not immediately revert from his cold warrior persona, but instead engaged in 
familiar epideictic appeals that blamed the USSR for perpetuating misguided perceptions. Unlike 
his rhetoric of the past, though, Kennedy and Sorensen made a clear effort to refrain from 
assigning blame directly to the Soviet government. The initial speech draft declared, “it is 
discouraging to realize that their leaders may actually believe—and I quote Chairman 
Khrushchev—that our foreign policy ‘is determined by class interests of monopoly capital…by 
those bourgeoisie groups which enrich themselves on the arms race.’”75 Because blaming the 
Soviet leadership would discourage US citizens’ support for cooperation on a test ban and strain 
the superpowers’ already tense relationship, the president instead claimed, “It is discouraging to 
think their leaders may actually believe what their propagandists write.”76  
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Kennedy then gave an illustration of outlandish claims from Soviet propagandists that 
maintained the United States was preparing to wage war on the USSR and that the political goals 
“‘of the American imperialists are to enslave economically and politically the European and 
other capitalist countries. . .  and to achieve world domination.’”77 By attributing blame for 
overtly false accusations to vague “propagandists,” rather than to Khrushchev himself, the 
president engaged in dissociation that redefined Soviet leaders and, by implication, Soviet 
citizens, as ignorant, misled people rather than evil people. He further suggested that it was the 
propagandists who were malevolent, for after providing examples from their messages, Kennedy 
commented, “Truly, as it was written long ago: ‘The wicked flee when no man pursueth.’”78 By 
using “truly” to set up this biblical allusion to Proverbs, Kennedy not only cast the propagandists 
as wicked and their claims as baseless, but also depicted his own stance as moral and accurate. 
Universities were, he had asserted, places where ignorance was revealed and truth disseminated. 
Thus, Kennedy, the epideictic teacher, simultaneously unveiled the true source of misguided 
Soviet perceptions—ignorance cultivated by “propagandists”—and gave hope that such 
ignorance could be remedied, an assertion once more reflecting progressivism’s faith in 
education. 
As he continued, Kennedy persisted in blaming communist propagandists, but depicted 
their work as a cause for sorrow, rather than anger. The president said it made him “sad” when 
he realized “the extent of the gulf” between the two nations.79 Nevertheless, a gulf is capable of 
being bridged, implying that US-Soviet differences could be spanned. Mending this relationship 
was only possible, however, if Americans took Soviet ignorance as a warning “not to fall into the 
same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to 
see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more 
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than an exchange of threats.”80 By discussing Soviet ignorance this way, Kennedy alluded to 
principles inherent in genuine peace—for instance, that peace does not require absolute 
agreement—and thereby linked genuine peace with the re-examination of American attitudes 
toward the USSR. The president simultaneously reaffirmed genuine peace by contrasting it with 
the Soviet people’s misguided understanding of peace and possible cooperation with the United 
States, and he made use of anaphora, alliteration, assonance, antithesis, and balanced structure to 
do so. Epideictic rhetoric, of course, often contrasts a group and its values with those who differ 
as a way of producing group unity.81 While the president’s rhetoric certainly contrasted his 
American listeners—who, he argued, were open to the truth—with their Soviet counterparts who 
had been misled by propagandists, Kennedy also suggested that Americans should be wary, lest 
they succumb to similar deceptions. Indeed, he may have intended his words as a warning to 
Americans not to be misled by US propagandists, who would inevitably reject and campaign 
against genuine peace with the USSR. 
 The president’s ascription of blame to nameless, ambiguous Soviet “propagandists” also 
laid the groundwork for his outright praise of the Soviet people, which further refined his 
portrayal of them as misguided yet still virtuous.82 According to Kennedy, the Soviets were not 
immoral, for “No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as 
lacking virtue.”83 His words offered hope, because if the Soviets were good people simply misled 
by propagandists, then the two countries could potentially reconcile their differences by 
expelling ignorance. 
To continue inspiring attitudinal change, Kennedy focused on the USSR’s 
accomplishments, US-Soviet commonalities, and collective memories of World War II. He 
recognized the Soviet people’s “many achievements—in science and space, in economic and 
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industrial growth, in culture and acts of courage” as a source of justifiable pride.84 By glossing 
over negative US memories of Soviet successes like Sputnik and by praising the USSR’s 
advancements as solely positive deeds, Kennedy encouraged Americans to view the Soviets not 
as an enemy to defeat, but as a hard-working, accomplished people.85 
Next, the president claimed that the USSR and the United States had many similarities, 
with their “mutual abhorrence of war” constituting the strongest tie.86 To make this claim easier 
to accept, Kennedy drew on collective memories of World War II to demonstrate the Soviet 
Union’s virtue. Narrating the USSR’s losses was an attempt to elicit compassion and help 
Americans understand why the Soviet people would desire peace. Kennedy declared, “no nation 
in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union in the Second World War.”87 To 
emphasize the extent of devastation, he listed Soviet losses—20 million killed, millions of homes 
and farms destroyed, and a third of the nation’s territory laid waste. Kennedy put the enormity of 
this suffering into perspective for Americans by explaining that the amount of Soviet territory 
“turned into a wasteland” was “equivalent to the devastation of this country east of Chicago.”88 
Soviet audience members also would have appreciated his acknowledgement of their sacrifice. 
Taken together, Kennedy’s descriptions established the integrity of the Soviet people—
and thus their nation—by admiring their accomplishments and encouraging compassion for their 
losses. His praise implied that Soviet achievements and sacrifices were no less significant simply 
because of the USSR’s vastly different ideology. Furthermore, the president’s focus on collective 
memories of World War II reminded both Americans and Soviets of a time when their countries 
were allies—he carefully omitted reference to the USSR’s initial alliance with Nazi Germany— 
thereby suggesting the potential for new cooperation. Like the rhetors in Vivian’s study who 
used epideictic performance constructively to resolve intrastate conflict,89 Kennedy “re-
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membered” the history of US-Soviet relations in order to make a more productive relationship in 
the present seem possible. The president added that the two nations “have never been at war with 
each other,” an accomplishment nearly “unique, among the major world powers,”90 which 
suggested a sturdy basis for improved relations. 
 By blaming propagandists rather than the Soviet leadership, praising the virtue of the 
Soviet people, and establishing shared commonalities, Kennedy constructed a consubstantial 
framework in which the two countries once again were partners and, in fact, shared a common 
foe, a framework he had suggested earlier when discussing the new face of war.91 Kennedy now 
returned to the idea by describing the horrific consequences of nuclear war for both nations. He 
proclaimed that “should total war ever break out again…the two strongest powers,” the United 
States and the USSR, would be the main targets and suffer the most “devastation.” He stressed 
the potential annihilation the two countries faced when he stated, “All we have built, all we have 
worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours.”92 Indeed, the president acknowledged that 
the United States and the USSR shared the “heaviest” burdens of the Cold War since both 
countries had committed huge amounts of money to nuclear weapons, money that could be better 
spent “to combat ignorance, poverty and disease,”93 a claim that again alluded to the United 
States’ progressive past and its emphasis on education and the application of resources and 
expertise to combat social ills.94 Here, the president’s reference to “ignorance” also directed 
listeners back to genuine peace as a concept associated with dispelling ignorance. 
 Kennedy therefore argued that the main peril of the early 1960s was not the USSR, but 
rather nuclear weapons and the arms race, which had driven the superpowers together, forcing 
them to assume the world’s greatest responsibilities. Moreover, he assigned blame to both 
countries, noting that they were “caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle with suspicion on 
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one side breeding suspicion on the other, and new weapons begetting counter-weapons,”95 his 
depiction of mutual blame again reflecting a characteristic that Vivian identified in the use of 
epideictic rhetoric to move constructively beyond intrastate conflict.96 
Neatly intertwining the concepts of genuine peace, a newly-humanized USSR, and the 
shared danger of nuclear weapons, Kennedy’s epideictic progression pointed to the need for 
future political action by confidently asserting that it was in the interests of both nations to secure 
a “genuine peace.”97 The president hinted that a treaty to halt the arms race would be the best 
course of action, as “even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those 
treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest.”98 Kennedy 
then asked listeners, in light of potential nuclear devastation, to adopt the principle of genuine 
peace and to remember important commonalities that the United States and USSR shared. As he 
interwove these three ideas, the president began his entreaty with antithesis and ended it with 
anaphora: “So, let us not be blind to our differences—but let us also direct our attention to 
common interests and the means by which our differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end 
now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final 
analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same 
air. We all cherish our children’s futures. And we are all mortal.”99 Alluding to concerns 
expressed by the “extremely earnest” American women who opposed nuclear war100—as well as 
by other activists in both the United States and abroad—Kennedy’s words transcended 
animosities between East and West. With the USSR established as a worthy partner for the US 
mission to achieve genuine peace and with blame for world tension shifted to the dangers of 
nuclear weapons, Kennedy then moved to alter one final set of perceptions likely to hinder 
acceptance of a limited test ban treaty. 
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Establishing the Reality of the Cold War and Credibility of the US Leadership Needed 
One remaining problem was the perception of the Cold War as a competition for ultimate 
victory, which left little room for negotiation and permanently pitted the United States and the 
Soviet Union against one another, while a second was the dominant mindset that negotiating 
with the USSR meant endangering US safety and straying from commitments to allies. In 
response, Kennedy reconceptualized the reality of the Cold War to make peace seem imperative 
and demonstrated that the United States—and, implicitly, his administration—had the leadership 
skills necessary to achieve peace without threatening security needs. His rhetoric thereby 
reflected progressivism’s optimism that formidable problems could be solved through the 
application of expertise. 
The president first used dissociation to urge listeners to reexamine their “attitude towards 
the cold war, remembering we’re not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points.”101 
The Cold War was not about “distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment.” Instead, 
Americans needed to “deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had the history 
of the last 18 years been different.”102 Drawing on the rhetoric of realism,103 Kennedy dissociated 
perceptions of the Cold War into those that were true and those that were false. His positive 
portrayals of the Soviet people and assignment of blame to the nuclear arms race had revealed 
the reality of the world situation, one in which genuine peace was both attainable and necessary 
to avoid nuclear war’s devastating consequences. 
After establishing the new reality of the Cold War, the president emphasized how it 
called for a new kind of leadership. He did not immediately propose a test ban treaty, but instead 
used epideictic progression to move his audience gradually toward it. Kennedy first talked in 
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broad terms about how the United States must “persevere” and “conduct our affairs in such a 
way” that the USSR would recognize “genuine peace” as in its interests.104 
However, since many Americans—and US allies—viewed negotiating with the USSR as 
imprudent, Kennedy next constructed a new kind of US leadership, one already embedded in 
current policies, that would both achieve genuine peace and protect vital interests. The president 
said to secure these ends, “America’s weapons are non-provocative, carefully controlled, 
designed to deter and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and 
disciplined in self-restraint. Our diplomats are instructed to avoid unnecessary irritants and 
purely rhetorical hostility.”105 In short, Kennedy depicted the United States as a virtuous 
exemplar that not only had the specialized tools and institutions in place for security but also for 
the endeavor of genuine peace. His words exemplified both technocratic realism and the 
progressive rhetoric from which it descended by emphasizing problem solving through 
“dispassionate, informed, and pragmatic expertise.”106 Kennedy then performed dissociation 
through polyptoton to explain this necessary, new-yet-old form of US leadership by reassuring 
dubious listeners that “we can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing our guard.”107 
Rather than completely break with his past rhetoric, Kennedy employed familiar praise 
and blame to underscore American moral superiority: “And, for our part, we do not need to use 
threats to prove we are resolute. We do not need to jam foreign broadcasts out of fear our faith 
will be eroded. We are unwilling to impose our system on any unwilling people—but we are 
willing and able to engage in peaceful competition with any people on earth.”108 In this passage, 
Kennedy indirectly indicted the USSR and/or communism in ways recognizable to his audiences, 
but also diminished the reproach by not naming the party with whom he was comparing the 
United States and by emphasizing peaceful competition.109 His praise and blame here were 
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significant because they demonstrated, enthymematically, that the president still understood the 
basic differences in character that separated the United States from the USSR and the free world 
from the communist world, but without engaging in explicit antithetical appeals that would 
undermine his earlier redefinition of the Soviet Union. He similarly attributed global tensions to 
“the Communist drive to impose their political and economic system on others”—a line that he 
and Sorensen took pains to soften from “the Soviet drive” that appeared in the initial draft—but 
immediately downplayed this criticism by observing that “if all nations could refrain from 
interfering in the self-determination of others, the peace would be much more assured.”110 
Kennedy’s words bridged his old rhetoric to the new so as to provide consistency and 
reassurance about the wisdom of his leadership, but without completely undercutting his earlier 
efforts to remake the USSR into a worthy partner for peace. The president’s paen to American 
virtue also reflected the nationalism of progressivism that undergirds both technocratic realism 
and prophetic dualism,111 thereby depicting his redefinition of the Cold War as a small shift, 
rather than a dramatic change. 
Working from abstract attributes to more specific actions, Kennedy continued to 
demonstrate the United States’ credibility as a virtuous nation that could offer the leadership 
needed for both a reconceptualized peace and a reconceptualized security. He mentioned, for 
example, how the United States wanted to assist the United Nations with its financial problems, 
make the UN “a more effective instrument” for the pursuit of genuine peace, and develop it into 
“a genuine world security system—a system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of 
insuring the security of the large and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can 
finally be abolished.”112 The president’s dissociation of security here matched his earlier 
dissociation of peace since genuine or real security could be found not in an ever-escalating arms 
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race, but in an international system of democracy that could lead to disarmament, a claim that 
invoked the progressivism of Wilsonian internationalism and its alluring dream of the League of 
Nations, a dream that—in popular recollection—citizens had supported and a shortsighted US 
Senate had thwarted, thereby leading to World War II.113 In addition, Kennedy pointed to 
specific exemplary US actions in the past—its “patient and persistent” attempts to make peace 
among nations in the “non-Communist world” in places like the Congo and US efforts to 
mediate differences with Mexico and Canada114—as evidence that the United States had both the 
competence and commitment needed to attain genuine peace. 
Kennedy then spoke directly to US allies, insisting that the United States remained 
committed to them out of a sense of both virtue and pragmatism. As he proclaimed, “The United 
States will make no deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations and other peoples, 
not merely because they are our partners, but also because their interests and ours converge.”115 
Notably, a comparison of the first and final versions of the speech indicates that Kennedy added 
explicit reassurances for Western Europe and West Berlin,116 as he likely assumed they would 
worry most about negotiation with the USSR and any sign of wavering US strength. 
Although the president stressed that both the United States and its allies were determined 
to protect the “frontiers of freedom,” he also underlined their common interest in “pursuing the 
paths of peace”117 and thereby set up his announcement of particular deliberative actions. 
Kennedy began by referencing acts already familiar to his audiences, such as the recent proposal 
to add a direct communication line between Moscow and Washington, DC. Additionally, he 
reaffirmed support for the ongoing Geneva arms talks as consistent with the “pursuit of 
disarmament [that] has been an effort of this Government since the 1920s,” as “urgently sought 
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by the past three administrations,”118 and hence, as faithful with longstanding bipartisan 
endeavors. 
Next, Kennedy raised the possibility of a limited test ban treaty, for such a treaty “would 
increase our security—it would decrease the prospects of war.  Surely this goal is sufficiently 
important to require our steady pursuit. . . .”119 He then made two major, but brief 
announcements:  the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom had agreed to 
begin talks on a test ban, and the United States would halt nuclear testing in the atmosphere, so 
long as other nations did the same.120 Each announcement prompted applause. Within the context 
that Kennedy had established, his declarations seemed to be reasonable responses to Cold War 
reality where nuclear weapons threatened the entire world and where the United States—and its 
president—were well equipped to provide the leadership needed to attain peace without losing 
security or abandoning allies. Indeed, Kennedy treated these announcements as almost routine by 
elaborating very little and instead turning to a domestic issue that might, at first blush, seem far 
removed from foreign affairs. 
Connecting Lessons on Genuine Peace to Domestic Civil Rights 
 In the days prior to his address, Kennedy was also grappling with the issue of civil rights, 
as Alabama Governor George Wallace had pledged to prevent the enrollment of two African 
American students at the University of Alabama. When Kennedy and Sorensen drafted his 
commencement speech, they likely were unsure of exactly when James Hood and Vivian Malone 
would attempt to register, but knew it would be after June 10, as the university did not want them 
registering the same day as white summer registrants. The president had, up to that point, 
maintained a primarily legalistic stance toward civil rights, even in the face of Bull Connor’s 
brutality in April 1963.121 In a nationwide address on June 11, the day after American 
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University’s commencement, Kennedy would move the case for racial equality to moral grounds 
and call for legislative action to desegregate public facilities.122 On June 10, however, he used his 
epideictic speech to link peace abroad with peace at home, thereby adumbrating value premises 
on which he would later draw. 
While not explicitly mentioning civil rights until the end of his address, Kennedy 
foreshadowed their appearance. His introduction praised American University as an “institution 
of higher learning for all who wish to learn, whatever their color or their creed,” and extolled the 
school’s “enlightened” mission, immediately adding “and I commend all those who are today 
graduating,”123 which extended his praise of tolerance—a value idealistically associated with 
progressivism—to the students before him, while also fulfilling epideictic expectations of 
congratulations. 
Kennedy’s speech clearly focused on international peace, but often his phrasing was 
multivocal, for his words also were meaningful in the context of civil rights.124 For instance, his 
definition of genuine peace—“the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living—the kind 
that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and build a better life for their children”—
could be applied to US race relations, too.125 Although many Americans viewed peace between 
black and white citizens as “impossible,” just as the president had described common perceptions 
of peace with the Soviets, Kennedy’s definition of genuine peace insisted that cooperation was 
possible. He maintained that genuine peace was a “dynamic” form of peace that transformed “to 
meet the challenge of each new generation.”126 Likewise, he insisted that genuine peace “does 
not require that each man love his neighbor—it requires only that they live together in mutual 
tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement,”127 a claim also relevant to 
race and illustrative of the democratic principles and progressive methods that Kennedy 
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associated with genuine peace. The president spoke multivocally, too, when he claimed that no 
matter how “fixed our likes and dislikes may seem,” history had shown that “surprising changes” 
in relationships may occur, for “enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last 
forever.”128 In all, Kennedy depicted genuine peace—a flexible concept that changed with the 
times, stressed tolerance, and provided hope without expectations of complete harmony—such 
that its attributes related to conflict resolution both abroad and at home. 
After announcing talks on a test ban treaty and the US decision to stop atmospheric tests, 
the president built upon this earlier multivocality for a more explicit lesson on genuine peace and 
civil rights. He stated, “Finally, my fellow Americans, let us examine our attitude towards peace 
and freedom here at home.”129 The word “freedom,” significantly, had appeared only twice 
earlier in the speech:  when Kennedy observed that Americans could attain genuine peace with 
the Soviets even if they personally found communism “repugnant as a negation of personal 
freedom,” and when he claimed that the United States and its allies had interests both in 
protecting “the frontiers of freedom” and in pursuing “the paths of peace.”130 Through these 
phrases, Kennedy reflected how most Americans perceived freedom and peace as cardinal US 
principles deserving of protection. He may have gradually redefined peace as genuine peace, but 
still depicted it as closely intertwined with freedom. 
In reexamining attitudes toward these values at home, Kennedy emphasized how national 
and individual actions must uphold both peace and freedom. The president emphasized, “The 
quality and spirit of our own society must justify and support our efforts abroad,” and he pointed 
to how some graduates would demonstrate the virtuous character of the country through Peace 
Corps service.131 Such actions alone, however, were insufficient. Moving from the broader 
international context to domestic civil rights, Kennedy asserted, “But wherever we are, we must 
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all, in our daily lives, live up to the age-old faith that peace and freedom walk together. In too 
many of our cities today, the peace is not secure because freedom is incomplete.”132 The failure 
to provide security for freedom abroad could endanger genuine peace, but the same disregard for 
freedom at home not only could lead to domestic conflict, such as the attacks on civil rights 
advocates, but also—the president implied—could harm efforts at peace abroad. 
With this intersection of domestic and international realms, Kennedy offered a specific 
accounting of obligations for civil rights: “It is the responsibility of the executive branch at all 
levels of government—local, State, and National—to provide and protect that freedom for all of 
our citizens by all means within our authority.  It is the responsibility of the legislative branch at 
all levels, wherever the authority is not now adequate, to make it adequate.  And it is the 
responsibility of all citizens in all sections of this country to respect the rights of others and [to] 
respect the law of the land.”133 Once again, the president employed anaphora—“It is the 
responsibility”—while his use of conduplicatio, through the repetition of “all” in successive 
clauses, emphasized the obligation that each and every party had to ensure freedom. Through 
such stylistic devices typical of epideictic, Kennedy encouraged listeners to yield to the form of 
his address as a way to encourage acquiescence to the image of the world he presented and to his 
legitimacy to direct action in response to that world. The president’s audience at American 
University shared its positive judgment of his appeal by interrupting him with applause, an 
action that functioned to endorse Kennedy’s statements. Of course, members of the campus were 
likely predisposed toward his views on civil rights, but that is why he had selected them as his 
immediate audience in the first place. 
 Kennedy realized, nonetheless, that many Americans might agree with his assessment of 
genuine peace in international affairs yet question its linkage to domestic issues of race, for he 
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quickly added that “all this is not unrelated to world peace.”134 Turning again to Proverbs, the 
president intoned, “’When a man’s way[s] please the Lord,’ the Scriptures tell us, ‘he maketh 
even his enemies to be at peace with him.’ And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a 
matter of human rights—the right to live out our lives without fear of devastation—the right to 
breathe air as nature provided it—the right of future generations to a healthy existence?”135 Just 
as Kennedy had used biblical injunction to disparage the acts of Soviet “propagandists,” he drew 
on it here to argue that actions at home impacted US credibility abroad, including efforts to attain 
genuine peace. His assertion employed dissociation to redefine “rights,” a concept traditionally 
associated with freedom, into “human rights,” a concept more clearly relevant to the issue of 
race, and then equated human rights with peace. Even Kennedy’s examples of human rights were 
multivocal, germane to threats posed by both racial discrimination and nuclear arms. 
 As the president closed, he returned more overtly to genuine peace with the USSR and 
reiterated his new vision of the world. Kennedy admitted that no treaty could “provide absolute 
security,” but insisted that an agreement written with the interests of its signers in mind and 
accompanied by effective enforcement would provide “far more security and far fewer risks than 
an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.”136 He reinforced his depictions of US 
leadership as appropriate for such a task by emphasizing that the United States would never start 
a war because “This generation of Americans has already had enough—more than enough—of 
war and hate and oppression,”137 a line that again spoke to both international and race relations 
and prompted a fourth burst of applause. At the same time, Kennedy reassured Americans and 
allies that the United States would always be prepared for war “if others wish it.” Nevertheless, 
he once more drew on progressive allusions to conclude, “we shall also do our part to build a 
world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just. . . . Confident and unafraid, we 
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must labor on—not towards a strategy of annihilation but towards a strategy of peace.”138 
Kennedy’s compelling peroration upheld a transformed image of the world in which genuine 
peace—a goal necessitated by nuclear weapons—could be attained with opponents through 
leadership that carefully protected security by being prepared for war while negotiating for 
peace. In regard to racial discrimination, Kennedy offered no deliberative remedies—those 
would come on June 11—but his multivocality and epideictic progression connected civil rights 
with his altered vision of genuine peace and foreshadowed the value warrants he would call upon 
the next day when he pointed out the hypocrisy of preaching “freedom around the world” but not 
providing freedom to African Americans at home, urged Congress to pass open accommodation 
legislation, and implored Americans to support such efforts.139 
Epideictic Progression and the Rhetoric of the Possible 
Overall, Kennedy’s address appeared to garner favorable responses. Although some 
congressional Republicans called it “a dreadful mistake,” he received mostly positive domestic 
reactions. The New York Times, for example, praised Kennedy’s “eloquent” entreaty, while 
columnist Walter Lippmann endorsed his appeals for “coexistence” as the only sensible option 
and—not surprisingly—liberal religious and political leaders expressed support.140 In the USSR 
and Eastern bloc, the state press both praised and critiqued Kennedy’s message. Nevertheless, 
the USSR broadcast the speech, in translation, with almost no interruption, rebroadcast it sans 
censorship and, soon after, stopped jamming Western broadcasts entirely for the first time in 
fifteen years. Khrushchev told US envoy Averell Harriman that Kennedy’s address “was the best 
speech delivered by any American president since Franklin D. Roosevelt.” The Council of 
Ministers also viewed the address favorably and permitted the Soviet press to publish it in full.141 
As for allies, the United States Information Agency reported that—aside from somewhat 
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negative responses in France and “friendly, but somewhat skeptical” reactions in Germany—
Western European media coverage had been “uniformly good.”142 
These positive responses notwithstanding, critics have cited two events that diffused the 
speech’s impact. First, Wallace’s refusal the next day to allow Hood and Malone to register 
prompted Kennedy to federalize the National Guard and address the nation on racial 
discrimination, which shifted public attention away from foreign policy and toward civil 
rights.143 Second, the president began a tour of Western Europe on June 23 that included his “Ich 
Bin Ein Berliner” address in which—as Windt put it—Kennedy got “carried away” and harshly 
criticized communism, which seemed to undercut his earlier message.144 
Nonetheless, negotiations on a limited test ban went forward. The president had 
undertaken his Western European trip to give allies—and anti-communists at home—additional 
reassurance that nuclear détente could be achieved without abandoning their interests, and his 
other speeches on the trip stayed consistent with that theme.145 Although the “Ich Bin Ein 
Berliner” speech was vacant of peace appeals, Khrushchev returned a favor that Kennedy had 
paid him in the midst of the missile crisis:  he ignored the belligerent message and responded, 
instead, to the conciliatory one delivered earlier. On July 2, the premier went to East Berlin, 
where—with most of his internal problems temporarily resolved—he announced that the USSR 
would accept a limited test ban treaty.146 In August, Great Britain, the United States, and the 
USSR signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). The US Senate approved it by a margin of 80 
to 19, and Kennedy signed the LTBT into law on October 7. Public opinion research found 76 
percent of Americans supported the treaty, with only 16 percent opposed, while it also “boosted 
American prestige” in France, England, Italy, and Germany.147 
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Our study has implications both for rhetorical studies and for interdisciplinary 
scholarship on peace and conflict. While Western culture often takes ceremonial discourse for 
granted as superficial platitudes, some rhetorical scholars have, conversely, criticized the use of 
epideictic oratory to attack the vulnerable or suppress dissent, while others have praised its value 
as a safe means by which individuals low in societal power may challenge conventions.148 
Scholars in the area of peace and conflict, meanwhile, have shed light on the socio-psychological 
barriers that impede peace efforts and the impact of media framing on public attitudes, but have 
paid relatively little attention to public address generally, let alone epideictic discourse 
specifically.149 One of the rare places where rhetorical studies and peace studies have intersected 
is in Vivian’s examination of how four different leaders used epideictic performances in 
intrastate conflicts to offer group motivations for war or peace, particularly through the provision 
of collective memories.150 
Our analysis of Kennedy’s American University speech builds on past research—
particularly Vivian’s work—in several ways. First, our study affirms that elected leaders may 
employ epideictic discourse to inculcate change that can lead to peace. While any form of 
rhetoric may be utilized for good or ill, the president’s address demonstrates how epideictic 
performance can challenge old prejudices and imagine new worlds, a task especially pertinent to 
calls for peace and social justice. Kennedy’s use of his speech to prepare the way for his June 11 
civil rights address also suggests how ceremonial speeches may offer refined value warrants and 
visions of reality on which subsequent, more deliberative messages build.151 Additionally, our 
study affirms that “mutual blame” is an available strategy for epideictic performances on behalf 
of peace in interstate, as well as intrastate conflicts. References to mutual responsibility violate 
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bipolar worldviews, thereby pointing the way to more nuanced perceptions on the part of citizens 
and also on the part of allies and enemies “listening in” through media coverage.  
More importantly, however, we identify yet another strategy, epideictic progression, 
whereby leaders may draw upon an intricate combination of dissociation and epideictic norms to 
instigate profound change on behalf of peace. In this respect, Kennedy’s epideictic progression 
reflects the sophists’ view of rhetoric, as articulated by Poulakos, where a rhetor initially 
addresses listeners “as they are and where they are” and then constructs a “vision of a new 
world” and “invites them to join him there by honoring his disclosure and by adopting his 
suggestion.”152 Dissociation permits the epideictic rhetor to create this novel perspective by 
discursively building it out of familiar cultural materials. While Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
observed how epideictic discourse and dissociation might work hand in hand, we have 
demonstrated through the concept of epideictic progression how rhetors may alter not just a 
single perception, but a whole succession of perceptions, offering explanation for acceptance of 
the first perceptual shift before moving to the next and then interweaving each altered concept 
with the preceding ones. The potential to recast symbolic worldviews so thoroughly could be 
especially useful to peace efforts. 
Kennedy’s rhetoric used epideictic progression at a time when prophetic dualism still 
heavily influenced American culture, but growing anti-nuclear protests and shocking 
reverberations of the missile crisis suggested an opening for the countervailing rationality of 
progressivism. The president sequentially used dissociation to redefine “genuine peace” into both 
a goal and a process that were universal, rational, achievable, realistic, and democratic. Through 
a series of intertwining dissociations that appealed to progressive values, Kennedy likewise 
humanized the Soviets as worthy partners, provided a realistic perspective on the Cold War, and 
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established that both he and the United States had the leadership needed to achieve “genuine 
peace.” The president thereby encouraged Americans to forego prophetic dualism and to assume 
the identity of a demos committed to a tolerant, pragmatic, dynamic, and achievable “genuine 
peace,”153 an identity congruent with the cultural and symbolic past, yet adaptable to a new 
present and future with the USSR. As such, Kennedy’s epideictic progression engaged in what 
Vivian calls “public forgetting” by helping the polity to “terminate a past no longer serviceable” 
and to “reinvent itself, to begin anew.”154 Two scholars whose work on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has also bridged rhetorical studies and peace studies, Rowland and Frank, have further 
argued that rhetors who employ pragmatic arguments to legitimize peacemaking have to 
“account for both identity and the need for compromise.”155 Through our analysis, we illumine 
one way—epideictic progression—through which such legitimation may occur. 
Another implication is the significant role that high style appears to play in epideictic 
peace performances. As noted earlier, epideictic rhetoric places the rhetor in a pedagogical 
position of authority, but the form of epideictic discourse—including the high style discussed 
here—has “an institutional character, or ethos” that lends legitimacy to rhetors and their 
claims.156 In this sense, artfully enacted style can increase the probability that listeners will 
positively judge the speaker’s performance and be swayed by her appeals. Through figures like 
polyptoton and antithesis, the rhetor can also engage in epideictic progression by dissociating 
concepts while still remaining consistent with stylistic norms. The familiar cultural materials on 
which the rhetor draws for epideictic progression—in Kennedy’s case, progressivism—may also 
be reinvigorated by the engaging nature of the rhetor’s style. Other attributes of high style such 
as anaphora, assonance, and balanced structure play a role by encouraging collaboration with the 
formal aspects of the message and therefore increasing the likelihood that listeners will accept its 
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content. War is, Burke tells us, the “ultimate disease of cooperation,”157 but Kennedy’s address 
demonstrates that listeners may likewise arrive at the cure of peace through stylistic cooperation. 
For the sophists, as well as for the Roman rhetoricians, invention could not be severed from 
style, and both Cicero and Quintilian stressed that the rhetor not only must convince listeners of 
the facts leading to a particular conclusion but also use a fitting style to stir the emotions.158  
The merging of argument with collaborative action and emotion may be especially 
crucial to epideictic performances for peace. In Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, Cole explains 
that rituals can help to alter community perceptions of trauma if the rituals make use of affect—
including affect “produced collectively during the rite” through community witnessing and ritual 
call and response—and if the rituals fuse the affect with “a strategically produced narrative.”159 
The value of high style in epideictic performances for peace is that it enhances legitimacy and 
enacts dissociative arguments while also binding the audience and rhetor together through 
stylistic cooperation and emotional arousal in a transformative, strategic rhetoric and ritual. 
Indeed, Campbell and Jamieson maintain that high style “heightens experience” and “invites 
contemplation,”160 which leads us to conclude that a dearth of high style in a leader’s repertoire 
will limit her ability to construct compelling new visions for citizens to contemplate and adopt 
even when peace, pragmatically, makes sense. Because our analysis encompasses just one case, 
additional studies of how leaders use epideictic rhetoric to advance peace could shed light on the 
role of style in such discourse and any cultural differences in high style. Kennedy’s American 
University address, nevertheless, indicates the promise of stylized epideictic performances. Just 
as medical professionals have found that rituals like singing familiar hymns may briefly “bring 
back” patients with dementia by stimulating memories and emotions, 161 rituals of epideictic 
progression—with their dissociative arguments that gradually transform familiar identities and 
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worldviews and their collaborative high style that evokes emotion—may likewise have the 
potential, in a more lasting way, to pull citizens back from the dementia of war. 
Finally, our study sheds light on the rhetoric of Kennedy himself. Scholars have 
documented the president’s penchant for antithesis in his ceremonial speeches,162 as well as his 
use of dissociation in his Houston Ministerial Association address, his public response to the 
steel crisis, and his Yale University commencement speech. Murphy goes so far as to call 
Kennedy’s “New Economics” address at Yale “one large dissociation” and notes that his 
emphasis upon “real” economic issues constructed his rational ethos.163 Based upon our analysis, 
we would argue that Kennedy’s style and dissociations likely worked in tandem, especially in 
ceremonial speeches, not only to offer new visions but also to situate him as a realist who 
understood how the world worked and whose views could therefore be trusted. The president’s 
stylistic reliance upon antithesis may have naturally led him toward dissociation and the 
performance of rationality.164 Hence, the continued appeal of Kennedy’s rhetoric may lie with 
how his stylistic artistry enhanced his legitimacy while dissociatively constructing new visions in 
an aesthetically pleasing and involving way. 
Despite passage of the LTBT, the thaw in US-Soviet relations was only temporary. The 
parties involved missed the opportunity for a comprehensive ban and, all too soon, Kennedy 
would be dead, his successor distracted by Vietnam, and Khrushchev overthrown in a coup.165 
While the image offered at American University was not fully realized, Kennedy’s rhetorical 
vision nevertheless helped lead to a treaty that slowed nuclear proliferation and showed that 
“selective cooperation” was possible, thereby setting the stage for later détente.166 Moving away 
from conflict and toward peace never comes easily. However, Kennedy’s American University 
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address demonstrates the important role that epideictic progression can play in leading 
audiences, gradually, toward a better way. 
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